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Abstract: Building resilience in urban drainage systems requires consideration of a wide range of threats that 
contribute to urban flooding. Existing hydraulic reliability based approaches have been focused on quantifying 
functional failure caused by extreme rainfall or increase in dry weather flows that lead to hydraulic overloading 
of the system. Such approaches however, do not fully explore the full system failure scenario space due to 
exclusion of crucial threats such as equipment malfunction, pipe collapse and blockage that can also lead to 
urban flooding. In this research, a new analytical approach based on global resilience analysis is investigated 
and applied to systematically evaluate the performance of an urban drainage system when subjected to a wide 
range of structural failure scenarios resulting from random cumulative link failure. Link failure envelopes, 
which represent the resulting loss of system functionality (impacts) are determined by computing the upper and 
lower limits of the simulation results for total flood volume (failure magnitude) and average flood duration 
(failure duration) at each link failure level. A new resilience index that combines the failure magnitude and 
duration into a single metric is applied to quantify system residual functionality at each considered link failure 
level. With this approach, resilience has been tested and characterized for an existing urban drainage system in 
Kampala city, Uganda. In addition, the effectiveness of potential adaptation strategies in enhancing its resilience 
to cumulative link failure has been tested.  
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Nomenclature 9 
rsi random link failure sequence 10 
nsi random failure sequences for the existing system 11 
csi  random failure sequences for the centralised storage strategy 12 
dsi random failure sequences for the distributed storage strategy 13 
N total number of links  14 
n Manning’s roughness coefficient 15 
tf mean duration of nodal flooding 16 
tt        total rainfall event duration 17 
Reso operational resilience index 18 
T rainfall return period in years 19 
VTF total flood volume 20 
VTI total inflow volume 21 
µ mean 22 
σ standard deviation 23 
  24 
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1. Introduction 
Recent natural and manmade catastrophic events that have led to extreme flooding in various 25 
cities worldwide have underscored the need to build resilience into existing urban drainage 26 
and flood management systems as a key strategy to minimise the resulting flooding impacts 27 
and consequences (Djordjević et al., 2011; Park et al., 2013). Urban drainage system flooding 28 
is not only caused by external climate-related and urbanisation threats such as extreme 29 
rainfall and increasing urbanisation but also internal system threats for example equipment 30 
malfunction, sewer collapse and blockages (Kellagher et al., 2009; Mugume et al., 2014; Ryu 31 
and Butler, 2008; Ten Veldhuis, 2010). System or component failures can either be abrupt 32 
(unexpected) shocks for example pump or sensor failure or chronic pressures such as asset 33 
aging and long term asset decay or sewer sedimentation. The impact of such failures, either 34 
singly or in combination on existing urban drainage infrastructure could significantly reduce 35 
the expected flood protection service levels in cities and lead to negative consequences such 36 
as loss of lives, damage to properties and critical infrastructure (Djordjević et al., 2011; 37 
IPCC, 2014; Ryu and Butler, 2008; Ten Veldhuis, 2010). 38 
Consequently, the need to build resilience in urban drainage systems (UDSs) is increasingly 39 
recognised as vital to enhance their ability to maintain acceptable flood protection service 40 
levels in cities that they serve and to minimise the resulting flooding consequences during 41 
unexpected or exceptional loading conditions that lead to system failure (Butler et al., 2014; 42 
Djordjević et al., 2011). Although the application of concept of resilience to infrastructure 43 
systems is a recent development, there is an extensive literature on definitions and 44 
interpretation of resilience, much of which has come from the ecological systems academic 45 
community (Butler et al., 2014; Park et al., 2013). Ecological system resilience is interpreted 46 
as a measure of system integrity and is defined as a system’s ability to maintain its basic 47 
structure and patterns of behaviour (i.e. to persist) through absorbing shocks or disturbances 48 
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under dynamic (non-equilibrium) conditions (Holling, 1996). In contrast to ecological 49 
systems, engineering systems are product of intentional human invention and are designed to 50 
provide continued (uninterrupted) services to society in an efficient manner (Blackmore and 51 
Plant, 2008; Holling, 1996; Park et al., 2013). Engineering system resilience is therefore 52 
interpreted differently from ecological resilience and focuses on ensuring continuity and 53 
efficiency of system function during and after failure (Butler et al., 2014; Lansey, 2012) 54 
In the context of urban drainage, current design and rehabilitation approaches tend to focus 55 
on prevention of hydraulic (functional) failures resulting from a specified design storm of a 56 
given frequency (i.e. return period). The design storm return period determines the flood 57 
protection level provided by the system (Butler and Davies, 2011). However, such hydraulic 58 
reliability-based design approaches place significant emphasis on identifying and quantifying 59 
the probability of occurrence of extreme rainfall and minimising the probability of the 60 
resulting hydraulic failures i.e. the fail-safe approach (Ryu and Butler, 2008; Thorndahl and 61 
Willems, 2008). However, such approaches fail to consider other causes of failure for 62 
example structural or component failures (Table 1) which also lead to flooding (e.g. 63 
Kellagher et al., 2009; Mugume et al., 2014; Ten Veldhuis, 2010).  64 
Table 1: Failure modes in urban drainage systems 65 
Failure mode 
 
Functional failure 
 
 
 
 
Structural failure 
Description 
 
Hydraulic overloading due to changes in inflows 
leading to failure e.g. overflow operation, 
surcharging and surface flooding 
 
 
Malfunctioning of single or multiple components in 
the system such as pumps, tanks or pipes leading to 
the inability of the failed component to deliver its 
desired function in full or in part 
Examples/Causes 
 
Increase in dry weather 
flows, extreme rainfall 
events, excessive 
infiltration 
 
Pipe collapse, blockages, 
sediment deposition, solid 
waste, pump failure, rising 
main failure 
 
 66 
Furthermore, it is argued that the direct application of reliability-based approaches for 67 
evaluation of structural failures in UDSs could be insufficient mainly because causes and 68 
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mechanisms of failure are largely unknown and difficult to quantify (Ana and Bauwens, 69 
2010; Kellagher et al., 2009; Park et al., 2013; Ten Veldhuis, 2010). It is therefore important 70 
to develop new approaches that seek to ensure that UDSs are designed to not only be reliable 71 
during normal (standard) loading conditions but also to be resilient to unexpected 72 
(exceptional) conditions i.e. the safe-fail approach (e.g. Butler et al., 2014; Mugume et al., 73 
2014). In this study, the definition and interpretation of resilience in engineering systems is 74 
pursued. Resilience is formally defined based on recent work on ‘Safe and SuRe’ Water 75 
Management as the “the degree to which the system minimises level of service 76 
failure magnitude and duration over its design life when subject to exceptional conditions” 77 
(Butler et al., 2014). Exceptional conditions refer to uncertain threats or disturbances that lead 78 
to system failure for example climate change induced extreme rainfall events, sewer collapse 79 
or blockage. Based on this definition, the goal of resilience is therefore to maintain acceptable 80 
functionality levels (by withstanding service failure) and rapidly recover from failure once it 81 
occurs (Butler et al., 2014; Lansey, 2012; Park et al., 2013).  82 
Resilience is further classified into two broad categories: a) general (attribute-based) 83 
resilience which refers to the state of the system that enables it to limit failure duration and 84 
magnitude to any threat (i.e. all hazards including unknowns) and b) specified (performance-85 
based) resilience which refers to the agreed performance of the system in limiting failure 86 
magnitude and duration to a given (known) threat (Butler et al., 2014; Scholz et al., 2011). 87 
Reliability on the other hand is defined as the degree to which the system minimises the level 88 
of service failure frequency over its design life when subject to standard loading (Butler et 89 
al., 2014). Intuitively, it is argued that reliability and resilience are related with the latter 90 
extending and building on the former. It is consequently postulated that if resilience builds on 91 
reliability, by improving the former, the latter can also be improved (Butler et al., 2014). 92 
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Taking the UK water sector as an example, recent studies have proposed range of strategies 93 
or options for building resilience in UDSs (Cabinet Office, 2011; CIRIA, 2014; Mcbain et al., 94 
2010). These strategies generally seek to enhance inbuilt system properties or attributes such 95 
as redundancy and flexibility during design, retrofit or rehabilitation so as to influence the 96 
ability of the system to withstand the level of service failure and to rapidly recover from 97 
failure once it occurs (Hassler and Kohler, 2014; Vugrin et al., 2011). Redundancy is defined 98 
as the degree of overlapping function in a system that permits the system to change in order 99 
to allow vital functions to continue while formerly redundant elements take on new functions 100 
(Hassler and Kohler, 2014). In UDSs, redundancy is enhanced by introducing multiple 101 
elements (components) providing similar functions for example storage tanks or parallel 102 
pipes, in order to minimize failure propagation through the system or to enable operations to 103 
be diverted to alternative parts of the system during exceptional loading conditions (Cabinet 104 
Office, 2011; Mugume et al., 2014). Flexibility on the other hand is defined as the inbuilt 105 
system capability to adjust or reconfigure so as to maintain acceptable performance levels 106 
when subject to multiple (varying) loading conditions (Gersonius et al., 2013; Vugrin et al., 107 
2011). It can be achieved in UDSs, for example, by designing in future proofing options 108 
(Gersonius et al., 2013), use of distributed (decentralized) or modular elements for example 109 
distributed storage tanks, rainwater harvesting systems, roof disconnection and use of 110 
designed multifunctional urban spaces such as car parks, playgrounds or roads (Mugume et 111 
al., 2014). 112 
However, the operationalisation of resilience in urban drainage and flood management is still 113 
constrained by lack of guidelines, standards, and suitable quantitative evaluation methods 114 
(Butler et al., 2014; Ofwat, 2012; Park et al., 2013). In water distribution systems, a number 115 
of recent studies have investigated both component (structural) and hydraulic reliability 116 
when subject to stresses such as demand variations, single pipe failure and changes in pipe 117 
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roughness (Atkinson et al., 2014; Trifunovic, 2012). In urban drainage systems however, 118 
most quantitative studies tend to focus on investigating hydraulic reliability which only 119 
considers functional failures such as occurrence of extreme rainfall or increasing dry weather 120 
flows (Sun et al., 2011; Thorndahl and Willems, 2008). The main short coming of such 121 
approaches is that the full system failure scenario space that includes other causes of surface 122 
flooding such as equipment failure, sewer collapse and blockage is not explored.  123 
It is recognised that different threats or combinations of threats such as extreme rainfall or 124 
sewer failure could lead to the same failed state (i.e. surface flooding). Therefore, by only 125 
considering a narrow range of hydraulic failures, current approaches take a limited view of 126 
functional resilience with no due consideration given to structural resilience. Further 127 
research is needed to develop new quantitative approaches that explicitly consider all possible 128 
failure scenarios in order to holistically evaluate resilience in UDSs (Butler et al., 2014; 129 
Kellagher et al., 2009; Ofwat, 2012; Ten Veldhuis, 2010).   130 
In this study, a new global resilience analysis approach is developed, that shifts the object of 131 
analysis from the threats themselves to explicit consideration of system performance (i.e. 132 
failed states) when subject to large number of failure scenarios (Johansson, 2010). Global 133 
resilience analysis has been carried out by evaluating the effect of a wide range of 134 
progressive structural failure scenarios in various systems such as water distribution systems 135 
and electrical power systems (Johansson, 2010). The global resilience analysis (GRA) 136 
methodology is extended to investigate the effect of random cumulative link (sewer) failure 137 
scenarios on the performance of an UDS. The methodology is then applied to test the effect 138 
of implementing two potential adaptation strategies that is; introducing a large centralised 139 
detention pond or use of spatially distributed storage tanks) on minimizing loss of 140 
functionality during the considered structural failure scenarios.  141 
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The key strengths of the developed GRA method is that emphasis is shifted from accurate 142 
quantification of the probability of occurrence of sewer failures (e.g. Egger et al., 2013), to 143 
evaluating the effect of different sewer failures modes and extent, irrespective of their 144 
occurrence probability, on the ability of an UDS to minimise the resulting flooding impacts 145 
(e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009).  146 
Link failure envelopes, which show the upper and lower limits (bounds) of the resulting loss 147 
of functionality for each considered link failure level are determined based on the hydraulic 148 
simulation results from 49,200 scenarios. The failure envelopes reflect vital system resilience 149 
properties that determine the resulting loss of functionality when the system is subjected to 150 
increasing failure levels. Finally, a new resilience index, Reso that quantifies system residual 151 
functionality as a function of failure magnitude and duration is computed at each failure level 152 
for both the existing system and for the tested adaptation strategies.  153 
2. Methods 
2.1 Global resilience analysis (GRA) approach 154 
Global resilience analysis is applied to characterise the performance of an existing UDS when 155 
subject to a wide range of structural failure scenarios involving random cumulative link 156 
failure. Structural failure in an UDS can be modelled by removal of components for example 157 
sewers (links), storage tanks or pumps in the system to represent the inability of the removed 158 
component to deliver its prescribed function. In this study, links in an UDS are randomly and 159 
cumulatively failed and the resulting impacts on the global performance of the system are 160 
investigated for each failure level, until all the links in the system have been failed. This 161 
process of cumulative link failure is used to represent structural failure modes such as sewer 162 
collapse, blockages and sediment deposition in closed systems and blockage resulting from 163 
deposition of solid waste and washed-in sediments in open channel systems. The approach of 164 
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failing links randomly ensures that all links, N in the system have an equal probability of 165 
being removed (Johansson and Hassel, 2012). In addition, a step by step increase in sewer 166 
failure levels enables the exploration of the full sewer failure scenario space that ranges from 167 
predictable or commonly occurring failure scenarios such as single component (N-1), or two 168 
component (N-2) failure modes but also other unexpected scenarios involving simultaneous 169 
failure of a large number of components (e.g. Johansson, 2010; Park et al., 2013).   170 
To fully explore the extent of the failure scenario space in global resilience analysis, a very 171 
large number of model of simulations involving different failure scenarios would be required 172 
to capture the resulting flooding impacts (e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009). In addition, different 173 
possible sewer (link) states for example non-failed (good condition), partial or complete 174 
failure need to be evaluated (Ana and Bauwens, 2010; Kellagher et al., 2009). Taking an 175 
UDS with 81 links as an example, and assuming only two link states (non-failed or 176 
completely failed), the total number of link failure scenarios within the full failure scenario 177 
space would be 2.4 x 1024. To reduce the computational time, a convergence analysis (e.g. 178 
Trelea, 2003) is carried out to determine the minimum number of random cumulative link 179 
failure sequences, rsx that are required to achieve consistent results (refer to Supplementary 180 
information section 1.1). Given the significant computational burden of GRA, a simple 1D 181 
approach to modelling of surface flooding (of the minor system) is proposed rather than using 182 
more complex 2D overland flow models (Digman et al., 2014; Maksimović et al., 2009).  183 
2.2 GRA implementation 184 
The GRA method is implemented in the MATLAB environment linked to the Storm Water 185 
Management Model, SWMMv.5.1; a physically based discrete time hydrological and 186 
hydraulic model that can be used for single event and continuous simulation of run-off 187 
quantity and quality, primarily built for urban areas (Rossman, 2010). Link failure can be 188 
modelled in SWMM v5.1 by either significantly reducing pipe diameters in the model (e.g. 189 
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Mugume et al., 2014a) or increasing the Manning’s roughness coefficient, n to a very high 190 
value. In this study, link failure is modelled by increasing the Manning’s n from its initial 191 
(non-failed) state value (n = 0.020) to a very high value (n = 100). The high value of n was 192 
chosen because it significantly curtails the conveyance of flows in each failed link and hence 193 
enables modelling of complete failure of each link.  194 
Model simulations are carried out at each randomly generated link failure level and system 195 
performance is quantified using the total flood volume and mean duration of nodal flooding 196 
as key performance indicators. Surface flooding is simply modelled using the ponding option 197 
inbuilt in SWMM which allows exceedance flows to be stored atop of the nodes and to 198 
subsequently re-enter the UDS when the capacity allows (Rossman, 2010). The flooding 199 
extent at each node is modelled using an assumed ponded area of 7,500 m2.  Figure 1 further 200 
illustrates the adopted modelling framework. The main steps in implementing the GRA 201 
include: 202 
a) A simulation is run to assess UDS performance in its initial (non-failed) state using 203 
the considered extreme rainfall loading 204 
b) A randomly selected single link ci : i = 1, 2, 3,…N, in the UDS is failed and a 205 
simulation is run using the same extreme rainfall loading. This step represents single 206 
link failure mode and is denoted as N-1. 207 
c) Two randomly selected links, in the UDS
 
are failed (denoted as N-2 failure mode) and
 
208 
the simulation is repeated  209 
d) The procedure is repeated for all N-i: i = 1, 2, 3,…N failure modes until all the links in 210 
the system have been failed. 211 
e) The procedure in (a) – (d) is repeated to determine the minimum number of random 212 
failure sequences rsx that ensures convergence of results. A detailed description of 213 
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convergence analysis in GRA is presented in the Supplementary information section 214 
1.1). 215 
f) Using the determined rsx, the procedure in (a) – (d) above is repeated to investigate 216 
the effect of the proposed adaptation strategies on minimising the loss of system 217 
functionality resulting from the considered cumulative link failure scenarios.  218 
2.3 Determination of link failure envelopes 219 
The use of average values in reliability and resilience analysis simplifies results interpretation 220 
but can potentially hide key information about the range of possible failure impacts and 221 
consequences (e.g. Trifunovic, 2012). The process of determining failure envelopes provides 222 
a means of graphically illustrating the range of failure impacts at each considered failure level 223 
(e.g. Church and Scaparra, 2007). In this study, link failure envelopes are determined by 224 
computing the minimum and maximum values of all model solutions (total flood volume and 225 
mean duration of nodal flooding) obtained at each considered link failure level for the 226 
existing UDS and for the considered adaptation strategies.  The resulting envelopes represent 227 
the upper and lower limits of the resulting loss of system functionality (impacts) that 228 
therefore provide vital information about the resilience properties of the system being tested. 229 
If the resulting envelope covers solutions with lower impacts at all link failure levels, then the 230 
resulting loss of system functionality is minimised during the considered failure scenarios. If 231 
the resulting envelope covers solutions with higher impacts and with a larger range between 232 
the minimum and maximum values, the tested system exhibits higher loss of system 233 
functionality during the considered failure scenarios (e.g. O’Kelly and Kim, 2007).  234 
2.4 Computation of the flood resilience index 235 
The resilience index, Reso, is used to link the resulting loss of functionality to the system’s 236 
residual functionality and hence the level of resilience at each link failure level. The resulting 237 
loss of system functionality is estimated using the concept of severity, Sevi (Hwang et al., 238 
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2015; Lansey, 2012). Severity is interpreted as a function of maximum failure magnitude 239 
(peak severity) and failure duration (Figure 2). Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical response of 240 
an UDS (in which one or more links have been failed) to a single extreme rainfall loading 241 
scenario. In Figure 2, severity can be estimated as the (shaded) area between the original 242 
system performance level, Po and the actual system performance curve, Pi(t), at any time t 243 
after occurrence of a given threat that lead to system failure (Equation 1). 244 
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Where tf is the failure duration, to the time of occurrence of the threat, and tn the total elapse 246 
time. Equation 1 above is further simplified by assuming that the system failure and recovery 247 
curve is rectangular (Equation 2) 248 
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The resilience index, Reso, which is a measure of system residual functionality, is estimated 250 
as one minus the computed volumetric severity and is computed at each link failure level 251 
(Equation 3). 252 
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                    (3) 253 
Where VTF is the total flood volume, VTI the total inflow into the system, tf the mean duration 254 
of nodal flooding and tn the total elapsed (simulation) time.  255 
For a given threat (i.e. percentage of failed links), the proposed index quantifies the residual 256 
functionality of the UDS as function of both the failure magnitude (total flood volume) and 257 
duration (mean nodal flood duration). Reso ranges from 0 to 1; with 0 indicating the lowest 258 
level of resilience and 1 the highest level resilience to the considered link failure scenarios. 259 
Resilience envelopes are then derived by plotting the minimum and maximum values of Reso 260 
computed at each failure against the percentage of failed links. The resulting envelopes 261 
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graphically illustrate the system residual functionality at each considered link failure level. A 262 
detailed description the theoretical behaviour of an UDS during failure conditions and the 263 
derivation of the Reso is provided in Supplementary information section 1.3. 264 
3. Urban drainage system description and modelling results 
3.1 Case study UDS 265 
A case study of the existing urban drainage system in the Nakivubo catchment, a highly 266 
urbanized part of Kampala city, Uganda is used in this work. The system requires 267 
rehabilitation to minimize the frequency, magnitude and duration of flooding during extreme 268 
convective rainfall events (Sliuzas et al., 2013). A model of the existing system is built in 269 
SWMMv5.1. The full dynamic wave model in SWMM is used to route flows through the 270 
modelled UDS. The data needed to build the model has been obtained from a Digital 271 
Elevation Model (DEM) for Kampala (2 m horizontal resolution), a 2011 satellite image for 272 
Kampala (0.5m horizontal resolution), as-built drawings and from existing reports (e.g. 273 
KCC, 2002). A single, non-areally adjusted extreme event was used to represent a worst 274 
functional loading case in the GRA.  This event used was recorded on 25th June 2012 at 10 275 
minute resolution with a 100 minute duration and depth of 66.2 mm (Sliuzas et al., 2013).  276 
The existing primary and secondary conveyance system consists of trapezoidal open channel 277 
sections constructed using reinforced concrete in upstream sections and gabion walls in the 278 
downstream sections. The resulting hydraulic model of the system consists of 81 links, 81 279 
nodes and 1 outfall, and with a total conduit length of 22,782 m. The system drains into the 280 
Nakivubo wetland and finally into Lake Victoria. The gradients of the open channel sections 281 
range from 0.001 to 0.0124. The modelled system drains a total area of 2,793 hectares 282 
delineated into 31 sub-catchments (Figure 3Error! Reference source not found.). The 283 
computed average sub catchment slopes and percentage imperviousness range from 0.034 – 284 
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0.172 (Figure A.1) and 52.3 – 85.7 (Table A.1) respectively. The existing system is not 285 
always clean in a ‘business as usual’ case. This was reflected in the SWMM model by taking 286 
the initial value of Manning’s n as 0.020 which is the upper limit of the recommended range 287 
(i.e. 0.010 – 0.020) for concrete lined channels.   288 
3.2 Modelling the effect of adaptation strategies on UDS performance 289 
Enhancing the resilience of an UDS during design or retrofit can be achieved by altering its 290 
configuration in order to enhance its redundancy and flexibility. Redundancy could be 291 
increased by introducing extra elements such additional storage tanks, temporary storage 292 
areas or increasing spare capacity in critical links (Butler and Davies, 2011; Cabinet Office, 293 
2011; CIRIA, 2014). Flexibility on the other hand can be increased, for example, by 294 
designing in future proofing options, use of distributed elements and provision of back-up 295 
capacity (e.g. Gersonius et al., 2013). In this study, two adaptation strategies are modelled 296 
tested using the GRA methodology namely, addition of one large centralised detention pond 297 
(centralised storage strategy) and several, spatially distributed storage tanks (distributed 298 
storage strategy) respectively (Figure A.2).  299 
In the centralised storage (CS) strategy, a large centralised detention pond with a total 300 
storage volume of 3.15 x105 m3 is introduced upstream of link C47 (Figure A.2a) to enhance 301 
system redundancy. In choosing the possible location of the centralised storage tank, two 302 
main criteria were used; land availability and flow rates in the downstream links in the 303 
primary Nakivubo channel. In the distributed storage (DS) strategy, 28 spatially distributed 304 
upstream storage tanks with a combined total storage volume of 3.15 x 105 m3 are introduced 305 
at the outlets of the sub catchments to enhance flexibility in crucial points in the network 306 
(Figure A.2b). The DS strategy models upstream distributed source control.  307 
3.3 Simulation and performance assessment of the existing UDS 308 
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In order to test the performance of the modelled existing UDS, simulations were carried out 309 
and flows were investigated at selected links in the system (Figure 4). The hydraulic data on 310 
the selected open channel cross sections is presented in Table A.2. 311 
Lower peak flow rates, are simulated in most upstream links. The flow rates increase along 312 
the system leading to very high peaks in downstream links, for example flows of 297.4 m3/s 313 
and 318.2 m3/s are simulated at downstream links C76 and C81 respectively after an elapsed 314 
time of 75 minutes (Figure A.3). Globally, 57 links (70.4%) in the system experience 315 
hydraulic overloading that consequently leads to surface flooding. Hydraulic overloading in 316 
links occurs when: (i) the upstream ends of the link run at full capacity and (ii) when the 317 
slope of the hydraulic grade line exceeds the slope of the link (Butler and Davies, 2011). The 318 
most severe hydraulic overloading is simulated in 26 links (32%), with the duration of 319 
hydraulic overloading ranging from 13 – 54 minutes. 320 
The results of the simulation also indicate the system experiences flooding at a total of 57 321 
nodes, representing a flood extent of 70.7%, with a total volume of flooding of 706, 045 m3 322 
and mean nodal flood duration of 48 ± 4 minutes.  323 
3.4 Global resilience analysis of the existing UDS 324 
The proposed GRA methodology described in section 2 is applied to characterise the 325 
performance of existing UDS. The overall performance of the system is quantified by 326 
simulating total flood volume and mean duration of flooding resulting from 16,400 link 327 
failure scenarios generated from 200 random link failure sequences (Figure A.4).  The 328 
average values of the total flood volume and duration of nodal flooding are computed for all 329 
the considered link failure scenarios and are presented in Figure 5. The GRA results indicate 330 
that failure of just 10% of links leads to a disproportionately large increase of 91% in total 331 
flood volume (Figure 5a). Thereafter, further increase in the percentage of failed links leads 332 
to comparatively small increases in the total flood volume.  333 
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The situation is very different for nodal flood duration, where results show failure of 10% of 334 
links leads to just a 6% increase (Figure 5b). Globally, the results indicate that the failure 335 
duration increases from 41 minutes to 56 minutes representing an increase of 36.2% when all 336 
the links in the system are failed. 337 
3.5 Effect of adaptation strategies on system performance 338 
The GRA methodology is applied to test each of the proposed UDS adaptation strategies. An 339 
additional 16,400 link failure scenarios are simulated for the CS and DS strategies 340 
respectively that is, a total of 32,800 generated from a total of 400 random link failure 341 
sequences (Figure A.4). The effect of the CS strategy is a slight reduction of flood volume 342 
which occurs at lower link failure levels less than 60% with very little impact on flood 343 
duration at all failure levels. Globally, it results in a 3.4% reduction of total flood volume and 344 
a 1.1% increase in mean duration of flooding (Figure 5). 345 
On the other hand, the DS strategy results in a significant reduction of 32% total flood 346 
volume at all considered link failure levels. At link failure levels greater than 20% any 347 
additional increase in link failure levels leads to minimal increase in total flood volume. The 348 
strategy also reduces the mean nodal flooding duration from 48 minutes to 35 minutes giving 349 
a reduction of 27% for all considered link failure scenarios. Table 3 details the key statistics 350 
of the GRA results for the existing system and for the considered resilience strategies. 351 
Table 23: Mean values of GRA analysis results for all considered link failure scenarios. The values in the 352 
square brackets indicate the reduction range computed by considering 1 standard deviation of the mean. 353 
Strategy Flood volume (x103 m3) Mean nodal flood duration (hrs) 
  Mean, µ  Standard deviation, σ  % reduction  
Mean, 
µ 
Standard 
deviation, σ % reduction  
Existing 
system 
                   
1,457.5  143.6  0.80 0.07  
Centralised 
storage 
                   
1,408.8  183.4 3.3 [1.0  - 5.1] 0.81 0.07 -1.1 [-2.3 - -0.2] 
Distributed 
storage 
                      
986.1  96.3 32.3 [29.9 - 34.1] 0.59 0.03 26.8 [25.6 - 28.4] 
 354 
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3.6 Link failure envelopes 355 
The resulting link failure envelopes which represent the range of model solutions from the 356 
lowest to the highest flooding impacts computed at each link failure level are presented in 357 
Figure 6. For the existing UDS and considering the flood volume, a large range of deviation 358 
between the computed failure envelopes and the mean values (27 – 87%) is observed at lower 359 
link failure levels (<20%). A convergence of both failure envelopes is observed at higher link 360 
failure levels. The results from the nodal flood duration are different, and indicate a narrow 361 
range of deviation (< 26.3%) between resulting failure envelopes and the mean values at all 362 
link failure levels. Rather similar ranges of deviation between the resulting flood volume and 363 
flood duration failure envelopes and the respective mean values are observed for the CS and 364 
DS strategies respectively.  365 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the considered adaptation strategies, the generated 366 
link failure envelopes are plotted into one graph to map out the failure space common to all 367 
(Figure 7). Comparing the results of the CS strategy to those of the existing system, a slight 368 
downward shift of both the maximum and minimum flood volume failure envelopes is 369 
observed at lower link failure levels (< 40%), which represents the effect of the strategy in 370 
minimising the magnitude of flooding. However, there is no significant effect at higher link 371 
failure levels. Also, the results suggest that the CS strategy has minimal effect on the flood 372 
duration failure envelopes.  373 
For the DS strategy, a significant downward shift in the flood volume failure envelope (i.e. a 374 
reduction in the magnitude of flooding) is observed link failure envelope at all cumulative 375 
link failure levels. The strategy also limits the additional increase in flood volume for link 376 
failure levels beyond 33% i.e. a flattening of the flood volume failure envelope is observed at 377 
higher link failure levels. The strategy also shifts the flood duration failure envelopes 378 
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downwards (i.e. reduces the failure duration) for all considered link failure levels when 379 
compared the existing UDS.  380 
3.7 Resilience index 381 
The resilience index (Reso) is computed using Equation 3, for all simulated link failure 382 
scenarios. Based on the computed indices, resilience envelopes which represent the residual 383 
functionality of the whole UDS as a function of both the failure magnitude and duration are 384 
determined by computing the minimum and maximum values of Reso at each link failure 385 
level for the existing system for the tested adaptation strategies (Figure 8). To facilitate 386 
comparison of the performance of the tested strategies, an assumed acceptable level of 387 
resilience threshold of 0.7 is plotted on each of the graphs, as an example of the minimum 388 
acceptable flood protection level of service (for example no property flooding) that needs to 389 
be achieved by the considered adaptation strategies. 390 
The figure reveals large variations in Reso for the existing system and for the tested strategies 391 
at lower link failure levels (< 20%) with a convergence of the results occurring with 392 
increasing link failure levels.  For the existing UDS, the computed mean values of Reso range 393 
from 0.54 to 0.66. When compared to the resilience threshold, the results indicate that the 394 
existing system crosses this threshold when link failure levels in system exceed 6.2%. 395 
Considering the CS strategy, a slight improvement in Reso of 1.2 - 2.3% is observed. The 396 
results indicate that resilience index falls below the threshold value when link failure levels 397 
exceed 8.6%. When the distributed storage strategy is considered, higher mean values of Reso 398 
are computed (0.76 – 0.84). The results also indicate that for the DS strategy, the resilience 399 
threshold is not crossed at all link failure levels. Overall, the DS strategy leads to significant 400 
improvement in the Reso of 27.5 – 41.4%.  401 
4. Discussion of results 402 
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4.1 Existing system 403 
Considering the existing system, random failure of less than 20% of the links leads to 404 
disproportionately high degradation of system functionality magnitude (i.e. total flood 405 
volume). The disproportionately high loss of system functionality suggests that failure of a 406 
small fraction of links rapidly reduces the global hydraulic conveyance capacity of the 407 
(minor) system. This result is also confirmed by critical component analysis (e.g. Johansson 408 
and Hassel, 2012) involving targeted failure of single (individual) links in the UDS (Refer to 409 
supplementary information section 1.1, Figure S2) This therefore suggests that the existing 410 
UDS exhibits low levels of resilience to sewer failures. This could be attributed to the already 411 
insufficient hydraulic capacity of the system (due to use of an extreme rainstorm for 412 
modelling purposes) but could also be attributed to other key factors such as its dendritic 413 
network topology and limitations of using 1D modelling approach which excludes the 414 
contribution of the major system (i.e. effect of additional redundancies) in conveying surface 415 
flows to downstream parts of the system during extreme events.  416 
In contrast to the total flood volume, random cumulative link failure has a limited effect on 417 
mean nodal flood duration. This could be attributed to use of a single short duration rainfall 418 
event for the simulations as opposed to using multiple events. Similarly, this could also be 419 
attributed limitations of using a simplified above ground flood model. By using a simplified 420 
above-ground flood model, surface flooding which occurs in the major system (i.e. overland 421 
flood pathways such as roads, paths or grass ways) during extreme events and which may 422 
also cause substantial damage to property and infrastructure is not considered, which could 423 
also lead to inaccurate estimation of the mean flood duration (e.g. Digman et al., 2014; 424 
Maksimović et al., 2009).  425 
4.2 Effect of adaptation strategies 426 
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It is argued that an effective adaptation strategy should result in a downward shift (i.e. 427 
towards the origin) of the failure envelope of the existing system. By doing this, the failure 428 
magnitude and duration is minimised across the considered failure scenarios. The derived 429 
link failure envelopes suggest that CS strategy has a very limited effect on minimising the 430 
total flood volume, with the reduction being achieved at lower link failure levels. More so, no 431 
significant effect on flood duration at all considered link failure levels. As a consequence, the 432 
CS strategy only minimally improves the residual functionality of the existing system during 433 
the considered link failure scenarios. This therefore suggests that sewer failures could 434 
significantly limit the effectiveness of adaptation strategies involving enhancement of 435 
redundancy at a single location in the UDS.  This also suggests that other preventive asset 436 
management strategies for example improved cleaning and maintenance practices may be 437 
more effective for resilience enhancement, because they in increase spare capacity in the 438 
links themselves and minimise structural failure in existing systems (e.g. Ten Veldhuis, 2010) 439 
In contrast the CS strategy, the study results suggest that the DS strategy is more effective in 440 
minimising the resulting loss of functionality at all link failure levels. This could be attributed 441 
to the effect of increased the spatial distribution of control strategies (i.e. smaller 442 
decentralised upstream storage tanks with the same total storage volume as the CS strategy) 443 
results in optimal use of the total storage volume for reduction both the storm water volume 444 
and the inflow rates before entry into UDS. Reducing the stormwater inflows into the system 445 
in turn enables the degraded UDS to continue functioning with minimal impacts. It could also 446 
be due to a reduction in propagation of hydraulic failures from one part of the UDS to 447 
another, which suggests that the DS strategy improves the flexibility properties of the whole 448 
(minor) system. Using this argument, it could be suggested that adaptation strategies that 449 
increase the spatial distribution of control strategies in upstream parts of the catchment for 450 
example implementation of multifunctional (dual-purpose) rainwater harvesting (DeBusk, 451 
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2013)  at a city district or catchment scale could significantly increase the  resilience UDSs to 452 
sewer failures.  453 
4.3 Outlook 454 
The developed global resilience analysis approach presents a promising quantitative tool 455 
which opens up new opportunities for holistic and systematic evaluation of the effect of a 456 
wide range of threats that have not been considered in conventional hydraulic reliability 457 
based urban drainage design and rehabilitation approaches. Future research will compare the 458 
results obtained by the presented GRA method with those obtained by using dual-drainage 459 
(1D-1D) or 2D rapid flood spreading models (e.g. Blanc et al., 2012; Maksimović et al., 460 
2009) in GRA to account for the effect of the major system in providing additional system 461 
redundancies during flooding conditions.  462 
Additionally, the following areas are recommended for further research. 463 
• Investigation of the influence of inherent/inbuilt UDS characteristics for example 464 
network structure, network size (number of links), pipe diameters, pipe gradients on 465 
resilience to structural failures. 466 
• Investigation of the effect of other types of component failures (e.g. pump failures) on 467 
global resilience in UDSs. 468 
• Investigation of the linkages and interdependences between UDS failure (flooding) 469 
and unexpected failures in interconnected systems such as electrical power systems. 470 
• Further investigation aimed at linking the computed resilience indices to new 471 
resilience-based flood protection level of service standards that are based on 472 
minimisation of the magnitude and duration flooding as opposed to use of design 473 
return periods. 474 
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5. Conclusions 
This research has tested and extended the global resilience analysis (GRA) methodology to 475 
systematically evaluate UDS system resilience to random cumulative link (sewer) failure. 476 
The GRA method presents a new and promising approach for performance evaluation of 477 
UDSs that shifts emphasis from prediction of the probability of occurrence of key threats that 478 
lead to flooding (fail-safe approach) to evaluating the effects of a wide range of failure 479 
scenarios that not only includes functional failures but also structural or component failures 480 
which also contribute to flooding in cities.  481 
In this study, the effect of a wide range of random and progressive sewer (link) failure 482 
scenarios on the ability of existing and adapted UDSs to minimise the resulting loss of 483 
functionality has been investigated. Link failure envelopes have been determined by 484 
computing the minimum and maximum values of the total flood volume and mean nodal 485 
flood duration results generated by simulating a large number of random cumulative link 486 
failure scenarios. A new resilience index has been developed and used to link the resulting 487 
loss of functionality to the system’s residual functionality at each link failure level. Based on 488 
the results of the study, the following conclusions are drawn. 489 
• The presented global resilience analysis approach provides a promising quantitative 490 
evaluation tool that enables consideration of wide range of possible sewer failure 491 
scenarios ranging from normal to unexpected with reduced computational complexity. 492 
• The use of convergence analysis enables determination of the minimum number of 493 
random cumulative link failure sequences require to achieve consistent GRA results, 494 
which in turn enhances that practicability of resilience assessment by significantly 495 
reducing the computational complexity involved in simulating all possible sewer 496 
failure combinations. 497 
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• Building resilience in UDSs to unexpected failures necessitates explicit consideration 498 
of the contribution of different failure modes, effect of interactions between different 499 
failures modes for example interdependences between sewer failures and hydraulic 500 
overloading in UDS design or performance evaluation of existing systems. 501 
• Building resilience in UDSs should not only be addressed through capital investments 502 
aimed at enhancing inherent UDS properties such as redundancy and flexibility but 503 
should also consider investments in asset management strategies such as sewer 504 
cleaning and maintenance of existing UDSs.  505 
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Appendix 628 
Appendix Tables 629 
Table A.1: Sub catchment area and computed percentage imperviousness  630 
Sub catchment 
ID 
Sub catchment 
area (ha) 
Imperviousness 
(%) 
S1 83.6 69.9 
S2 59.5 71.3 
S3 69.0 67.2 
S4 97.2 84.1 
S5 52.0 81.1 
S6 46.1 76.6 
S7 23.8 82.7 
S8 10.2 66.2 
S9 60.0 72.4 
S10 144.4 72.0 
S11 76.1 71.5 
S12 81.4 71.1 
S13 50.0 79.6 
S14 67.3 75.3 
S15 57.4 70.7 
S16 55.4 52.3 
S17 67.9 61.5 
S18 52.9 56.6 
S19 52.3 66.7 
S20 158.8 61.5 
S21 108.5 71.6 
S22 71.0 78.2 
S23 89.1 82.1 
S24 25.4 85.7 
S25 199.9 68.1 
S26 115.7 62.7 
S27 147.5 80.7 
S28 134.4 75.8 
S29 23.1 81.1 
S30 88.7 69.1 
S31 424.4 73.0 
Total Area         2,793.2  
 631 
 632 
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 633 
 634 
Table A.2: Hydraulic data of selected trapezoidal open channel sections in the Nakivubo UDS. The slope values 635 
represent ratios of horizontal to vertical distance. 636 
Link          Length (m) depth, d (m) 
bottom 
width, b (m) 
left 
slope 
right 
slope 
Equivalent pipe 
diameter, De (m) 
C12             100.0 1.8 4.3 0.743 0.743 3.5 
C40             290.0 2.5 1.0 1.000 1.000 3.3 
C54             512.6 1.5 1.0 0.667 0.667 2.0 
C76             400.0 4.3 17.4 0.040 0.040 9.8 
C81             400.0 2.0 26.0 1.375 1.375 8.6 
 637 
Table A.3: Distributed storage tank volumes  638 
Storage tank ID Volume (m3) 
ds1 9,433 
ds2 6,711 
ds3 7,782 
ds4 10,956 
ds567 13,743 
ds8 1,151 
ds9 6,770 
ds10 16,287 
ds11 8,582 
ds12 9,181 
ds13 5,639 
ds14 7,591 
ds16 6,243 
ds17 13,623 
ds19 5,899 
ds20 17,906 
ds21 12,239 
ds22 8,011 
ds23 10,052 
ds24 2,859 
ds25 22,547 
ds26 13,051 
ds31 47,864 
ds30 10,000 
ds29 2,609 
ds28 15,160 
ds27 16,636 
ds15 6,474 
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Appendix figures 642 
 643 
Figure A.1 Computed sub-catchment slopes for the Nakivubo catchment 644 
 645 
 
 
Figure A.2 Layout of adapted UDS (a) centralised storage strategy (CS) and (b) upstream distributed storage 646 
strategy   647 
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 648 
 649 
Figure A.3 Simulated flows in the Nakivubo UDS for upstream links C12, C40, C54 and downstream links C76 650 
and C81. 651 
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Figures 656 
 657 
Figure 1: Modelling framework for cumulative link failure in a simplified urban drainage system with 8 links, 8 658 
nodes and 1 outflow illustrating (a) increasing link failure levels c1, c2, c3…..cN and (b) three potential random 659 
failure sequences, rs1, rs2 and rs3. 660 
 661 
Figure 2: Theoretical system performance curve for an UDS. The block solid line, Po represents the original 662 
(design) performance level of service. The blue dotted line, Pa represents a lower but acceptable level of 663 
service. Pf represents the maximum system failure level resulting from the considered threat. 664 
 665 
32 
 
 666 
 667 
 668 
Figure 3: Digital elevation model and delineated sub catchments in the Nakivubo catchment 669 
 670 
 671 
 672 
Figure 4: Layout of the modelled Nakivubo urban drainage network 673 
 674 
 675 
 676 
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 677 
Figure 5: Effect of cumulative pipe failure on (a) total flood volume and (b) mean duration of nodal flooding 678 
for the Existing Nakivubo UDS (ns mean), for the centralised storage strategy (cs mean) and for the distributed 679 
storage strategy (ds mean). 680 
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Failed links (%)
Fl
oo
d 
v
ol
u
m
e 
x
 
10
3  
(m
3 )
(a) Flood volume
 
 
ns mean
cs mean
ds mean
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Failed links (%)
Fl
oo
d 
du
ra
tio
n
 
(hr
s)
(b) Flood duration
 
 
ns mean
cs mean
ds mean
34 
 
 681 
Figure 6: Results of the generated link failure envelopes for total flood volume (a) – (c) and for mean duration of nodal flooding (e) – (f) 682 
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 683 
Figure 7: Intersection of cumulative link failure envelopes for the existing system (ns min and ns max), CS 684 
strategy (cs min and cs max), and the DS strategy (ds min and ds max). 685 
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 687 
Figure 8: Resilience envelopes showing maximum, mean, minimum values of Reso computed at each link failure level for (a) existing UDS, (b) CS strategy and (c) DS 688 
strategy. The red dashed horizontal line is an assumed minimum acceptable resilience level of service threshold of 0.7. 689 
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